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Abstract 
Although perceived continuity with one’s future self has attracted increasing research 
interest, age differences in this phenomenon remain poorly understood. The present study is the 
first to simultaneously examine past and future self-continuity across multiple temporal distances 
using both explicit and implicit measures and controlling for a range of theoretically implicated 
covariates in an adult life span sample (N = 91, aged 18-92, M = 50.15, SD = 19.20, 56% 
female). Perceived similarity to one’s self across 6 past and 6 future time points (1 month to 10 
years) was assessed with an explicit self-report measure and an implicit me/not me trait rating 
task. In multilevel analyses, age was significantly associated with greater implicit and explicit 
self-continuity, especially for more distant intervals. Further, reaction times in the implicit task 
remained stable with temporal distance for older adults but decreased with temporal distance for 
younger adults, especially for future ratings. This points toward age differences in the underlying 
mechanisms of self-continuity. Multilevel models examined the role of various covariates 
including personality, cognition, future horizons, and subjective health and found that none of 
them could fully account for the observed age effects. Taken together, our findings suggest that 
chronological age is associated with greater self-continuity although specific mechanisms and 
correlates may vary by age. 
 
 Keywords: Aging, decisions, self-continuity, time perception, temporal horizons 
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Most of us would agree that who we are depends not only on our present thoughts, 
feelings, and activities but also on our experiences and recollections of the past and the way we 
envision ourselves into the future; in other words, where we have been and where we are going. 
Initial inquiries in temporal construal relating the present self to the past self (temporal 
comparison theory; Albert, 1977) and to the future self (Parfit, 1971), have led to broader 
questions about the degree of temporal self-continuity that individuals experience over time as 
well as possible implications for well-being and decision making.  
With respect to aging, some have argued that self-continuity is a key element in 
preserving well-being and a sense of identity in the face of age-related changes (Baltes, 
Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 2006), but to date, relevant research is distributed across multiple 
fields, and individual studies focus on select aspects of past or future construal. The present 
study paves the way for an integration across theoretical frameworks by providing a 
comprehensive assessment of multiple aspects of past and future temporal self-continuity (TSC) 
in an adult life span sample.  
Theoretical Background 
 To put our findings into context, we now review existing lines of theory and research that 
have relevance to TSC but have approached it from different angles. Specifically, we draw on 
the literature on time horizons, life-span theories of developmental change, autobiographical 
memory and prospection, and behavioral economics. By integrating across these diverse 
theoretical frameworks, we develop the rationale for the present study. 
Time Horizons 
The perception of continuity or change in who we are is inherently linked to the way we 
perceive time itself. Thus, theories of age differences in time perception have a bearing on TSC. 
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Perhaps the most obvious predictions come from Janet’s (1877) proportional argument which 
asserts that “(…) the apparent length of an interval at a given epoch of a man’s life is 
proportional to the total length of the life itself. A child of 10 feels a year as 1/10 of his whole 
life - a man of 50 as 1/50” (James, 1890, p. 625). From this perspective, one would expect that 
the ratio of subjective time duration between two people is inversely proportional to their ratio in 
age. For example, for a 10-year-old, who is one fifth of the age of 50-year-old, a given time 
interval should appear five times as long, and this proportion should be the same regardless of 
the length of the time interval. This line of reasoning would predict age-related increases in TSC, 
because with advancing age, a given future time point should appear to be progressively closer to 
the present. 
Whereas the proportional argument assumes that time perception is subject to the same 
psychophysical rules as visual or auditory perception, Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (SST, 
Carstensen, 2006; Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999), provides an alternative view that 
emphasizes the emotional and motivational implications of perceived time. It suggests that age-
associated limitations in perceived time left in life prompt changes in goal priorities such that 
younger adults pursue future oriented goals such as information acquisition whereas older adults 
focus on emotional well-being in the present moment. Emerging research suggests that such 
global future horizons, which consider time relative to one’s whole life span, are empirically 
distinct from TSC which considers changes in the self relative to the present moment (Rutt & 
Löckenhoff, in press). Nonetheless, the age-related focus on the present moment predicted by 
SST might blur differences between the past, present, and future self with older adults living 
(subjectively) in an extended present. 
Taken together, both the proportional argument and SST would predict that TSC 
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increases with age, but whereas the proportional argument implies a consistent effect size across 
time intervals, SST merely predicts age-related increases in TSC without proposing a specific 
pattern.  
Life-Span Perspectives on Developmental Change 
Complementing the broad, time-based influences on TSC considered so far, life-span 
developmental frameworks offer a more nuanced perspective by considering age trajectories in 
specific self-relevant variables such as social roles and personal characteristics. In general, 
people tend to change less as they get older. Although subtle changes in personality traits can be 
seen across the adult life span, large-scale analyses indicate that the rates of change in specific 
personality traits decline with age and that people’s relative ranking within their cohort becomes 
more stable (Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006; Soto, John, Gosling, & Potter, 2011; 
Terracciano, McCrae, Brant, & Costa, 2005). Similar trends towards greater stability are seen in 
personal values and preferences (Quoidbach, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2013) and the composition of 
people’s core social networks (Martire, Schulz, Mittelmark, & Newsom, 1999).  
There are a number of theoretical explanations for such effects. Some have suggested that 
the neural substrates of personality undergo rapid maturation until young adulthood but remain 
relatively stable thereafter (McCrae & Costa, 2003). Others maintain that personality change is 
driven by people’s investment in new social roles (Lodi-Smith & Roberts, 2007) and that the 
frequency with which people take on new roles declines with age. Consistent with this notion, 
the creation of self-defining memories peaks in early adulthood (Rathbone, Moulin, & Conway, 
2008), and openness to experience, a personality trait associated with seeking out novel ideas, 
contexts, and activities shows steady decrements with age (Terracciano et al., 2005), further 
reducing the likelihood of encountering new roles and environments.  
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To some extent, self-continuity may not only reflect objective age-related changes but 
also beliefs and expectations about developmental change. In young and middle-aged adults, 
Quoidbach et al. (2013) found evidence for an “end of history illusion” according to which 
people report substantial changes in the past, but expect to remain comparatively stable in the 
future. Expectations about change in later life may also depend on the desirability of a given 
trait. Heckhausen and Krueger (1993) found that whereas expectations for desirable traits did not 
vary by age, younger adults expected undesirable traits to increase with age whereas older adults 
expected them to remain stable. This is consistent with action theoretical perspectives (Ebner, 
Freund, & Baltes, 2006) which propose that when age decrements in health and other resources 
prevent the pursuit of growth-oriented goals, older adults shift their focus towards maintenance 
goals and strive for continuity in their current abilities. 
Taken together, life-span developmental frameworks point towards age-related increases 
in TSC, but would predict that effects are sensitive to valence with younger adults expecting 
positive changes and older adults expecting (and actively striving for) continuity. Also, based on 
the “end of history effect” TSC may be lower for the past than for the future. 
Autobiographical Cognition 
 Age-related shifts in autobiographical cognition may have a bearing on TSC as well. 
The episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter & Addis, 2008; Schacter, Gaesser, & Addis, 2013) 
argues that recall of past events and anticipation of future events rely on similar resources, and 
access to these resources appears to vary by age. Compared to younger adults, older adults offer 
fewer episodic details related to specific events and they refer more to general semantic 
knowledge when recalling their past (for a review see Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008) or 
anticipating their future (Addis, Musicaro, Pan, & Schacter, 2010; Cole, Morrison, & Conway, 
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2013). These findings would suggest that age-related changes in past and future TSC are 
symmetrical. Further, reduced access to episodic detail may lead older adults to perceive higher 
similarity with past and future states and thus report higher levels of TSC. 
Behavioral Economics 
 A final line of relevant research comes from the field of behavioral economics where 
researchers have found that temporal discounting, the tendency to devalue future outcomes 
relative to more immediate ones, is reduced among older adults (for a review see Löckenhoff, 
2011). Recent findings suggest that such effects are at least partially explained by an age-related 
tendency to perceive one’s future emotions as more continuous with present feelings 
(Löckenhoff O’Donoghue, & Dunning, 2011), and research on younger adults provides direct 
evidence for a link between reduced temporal discounting and self-continuity (Bartels & 
Urminsky, 2011; Ersner-Hershfield, Garton, Ballard, Samanez-Larkin, & Knutson, 2009). Again, 
these findings point towards age-related increases in future TSC, although equivalent effects for 
the past remain to be explored. 
The Present Study 
In combination, the prior literature offers convergent arguments for age-related increases 
in TSC. However, theoretical frameworks vary in predicted effect sizes, the degree of symmetry 
between past and future TSC, as well as the role of desirability in expected changes. Also, a 
comprehensive understanding of age effects is hindered by discrepancies in research practices 
across fields. TSC has an explicit component (self-reports) and an implicit component (typically 
assessed through a “me/not me” task which contrasts trait endorsements for the present with 
those for the past and future, D’Argembeau, Stawarczyk, Majerus, Collette, & Van der Linden, 
2010), but the two rarely examined in the same study (for an exception, see Ersner-Hershfield et 
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al., 2009). Also, with the exception of the behavioral economics literature, most prior studies 
focused on extreme comparisons between the present and the distant past/future, and it is not 
clear whether TSC follows a stepwise or gradual function as temporal distance increases. Finally, 
studies often focus on either the past or the future, which makes it impossible to assess whether 
age effects differentially affect one or the other. 
 The present study aimed to address these limitations by measuring TSC in an adult life-
span sample using implicit and explicit measures across multiple temporal distances in both the 
past and the future. This allowed us to assess the slope by which the subjective present ‘slips’ 
into the future and past and to examine how this differs across individuals and by age. We also 
explored the degree of symmetry between future and past self-continuity (plotted as a function of 
distance from the present), differentiated between positive and negative changes, and considered 
potential covariates including subjective health (implicated by action-theoretical frameworks), 
future time horizons (implicated by the proportional argument and socioemotional selectivity 
theory), cognitive functioning (implicated by research on age differences in autobiographical 
thought), and personality (implicated by life-span developmental perspectives).  
 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-one community-dwelling participants aged 18 - 92 (M = 50.15, SD = 19.20, 56% 
female, 84% white) were recruited via advertisements and an existing database. We aimed for a 
sample representative of the local community and with comparable demographic characteristics 
across different ages. Table 1 shows descriptive sample characteristics and their associations 
with age. Participants were compensated $25 for their participation.  
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Materials 
Temporal distances. Temporal distances (at present, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 1 
year, 5 years, 10 years) were the same across all tasks described below. The higher sampling rate 
within the first year was based on pilot findings suggesting maximal interindividual variance 
within that time frame. Even though the distances up to 6 months may appear too short to capture 
temporal variations in self-continuity, the literature on temporal discounting has documented 
systematic age differences in responses to temporal distance within this range (e.g., Löckenhoff 
et al., 2011). 
Past and future ratings were presented in separate blocks and the order was 
counterbalanced across participants. For consistency, both the past and the future block included 
an “at present” condition. For further analyses, all target intervals were converted to months. 
 Guided imagination task. To ensure that participants’ mental representations of their 
past and future were primed in advance of the task, the past and future blocks began with a 
guided imagination task adapted from D’Argembeau et al. (2010) in which participants imagined 
themselves at each future interval or recalled themselves at each past temporal distance. For each 
interval they were given 15 seconds to imagine a typical day, including their activities and the 
people in their social networks at that time. 
Explicit TSC task. Participants rated perceived similarity with their future / past selves 
on a visual scale adapted from Ersner-Hershfield and colleagues (2009) based on the Inclusion of 
Other in the Self Scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). Participants chose among 7 pairs of 
circles labeled “current self”/”future self” and “current self”/”past self” that ranged from 
complete separation (1 = least similar) to almost complete overlap (7 = most similar).  
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Implicit TSC task. In a me/not me task adapted from D’Argembeau et al. (2010), 
participants indicated whether or not a trait adjective (e.g., wise) described them at a specified 
temporal distance. Six positive trait words (wise, patient, relaxed, tidy, forgiving, cheerful) and 
six negative trait words (dull, rude, withdrawn, careless, lazy, worrying) were selected from a 
standardized list (Anderson, 1968). Pairs of positive and negative words were matched, as 
closely as possible, on word length, number of syllables, and word use frequency based on the 
SUBTLEXus database (Brysbaert & New, 2009). Each trait word was presented once for each 
temporal distance. Four trials comprised a block, each block focused on the same temporal 
distance, and the order of blocks was randomized across participants. The target temporal 
distance (e.g., 6 months from now) remained at the top of the screen during each block as the 
trait words were presented, one at a time, and  participants responded either “Yes” or “No” via 
button-press.  
In addition to the 7 temporal distances (including “at present”), a control condition 
simply asked, “Is this a POSITIVE word?” This condition was included to test for systematic 
differences in reaction times (RTs) between the control condition and each of the temporal 
distances, as the control condition requires no intertemporal thought.  
For further analyses we computed the percentage of agreement with present trait ratings 
for each temporal distance. We also recorded RTs for each trial (outliers > 3SD above a 
participants’ mean were replaced with the participants’ mean). Preliminary analyses found that – 
as expected – reaction times were significantly shorter for the control task than for the other 
conditions. Also, results were not affected by the valence of the trait word. These variables were 
therefore dropped from further analyses. 
Measures 
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Demographics. We assessed age, gender, ethnicity, race, income (from 1 = lower income 
to 5 = higher income), and education level (from 1 = did not complete high school to 8 = 
graduate or professional degree). 
Future time horizons. On the Future Time Perspective Scale (FTP; Carstensen & Lang, 
1996), participants rated the degree to which they agreed with ten statements using a 7-point 
Likert scale. Statements covered topics such as the extent to which participants felt they had 
remaining future opportunities, expected to set new goals in the future, and whether their future 
was open-ended versus time-limited (Lang & Carstensen, 2002). For further analyses, we 
inverted reverse-coded items and computed a summary score with higher scores indicating more 
expansive time horizons. 
Personality. A 10-item screening measure of the Five-Factor Model of personality was 
administered (BFI-10; Rammstedt & John, 2007) generating 5 subscale scores corresponding to 
extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, neuroticism, and conscientiousness. 
Subjective health was assessed with the SF-12 (Ware, Kosinski, & Keller, 1996) where 
scoring algorithms yield separate ratings for mental and physical health. 
Cognition. Cognitive performance was assessed in the following domains: Vocabulary 
(Nelson-Denny Reading Test, vocabulary section; Brown, Fishco, & Hanna, 1993), processing 
speed (Digit-Symbol Coding; Wechsler, 1997), and working memory (letter-based n-back; n = 2; 
Ragland et al., 2002). 
Procedure 
Participation consisted of a single, 60-minute session. With the exception of the Digit 
Symbol task, participants responded to all tasks via computer (E-Prime, Version 2.0; Psychology 
Software Tools, 2009).  
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 After providing informed consent, participants completed a demographic questionnaire 
followed by the TSC measures. All measures were administered twice: In one block, participants 
responded regarding the future, and in another block they responded regarding the past. The 
order of the past/future blocks was counterbalanced across participants. Each block began with 
the guided imagination task followed by the TSC tasks. The order of the TSC tasks was 
counterbalanced across participants, but for each participant, the task order was the same for the 
past and the future block. Within each task, the various temporal distances and the control 
condition were presented in randomized order. Participants also completed a decision making 
task which is not discussed further since it goes beyond the scope of the present study.  
Participants then completed the future time horizon and personality measures, the 
subjective health assessment, and the cognitive tasks. Finally, they were paid, thanked, and 
debriefed. 
Data Analyses 
 The experimental design was nested such that temporal distance (in months) was nested 
within temporal direction (past vs. future) which was in turn nested within participants. We 
therefore employed multilevel modeling to examine age differences in different aspects of TSC. 
For all models, a random effect was specified for intercept. Fixed effects were specified for 
temporal distance, temporal direction (coded as past = -1, future = 1), and age. The model 
examining RTs in the implicit task also included “trait word” as an additional random effect to 
account for the influence of word length and other aspects of readability on response times. A 
natural log transformation was applied to the temporal distance variable to ensure that residuals 
fit criteria for normality. Age was centered at the sample’s mean (50.15) to allow for meaningful 
interpretation of the regression coefficients. Estimates were obtained using restricted maximum 
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likelihood estimation (REML).  
First, an intercept-only model was fit to the data for each dependent variable to estimate 
the ratio of interindividual-to-intra-individual variability. For explicit TSC, the intra-class 
correlation (ICC) was .26, suggesting that 26% of the total variance in explicit TSC was 
attributable to variability between individuals. For implicit TSC, the intraclass correlations were 
.29 for percent agreement with present trait ratings, and .30 for RT. This suggests a need to 
model both within- and between-subjects effects, justifying multilevel analyses as an appropriate 
approach to our data.  
For each of the three dependent variables (explicit TSC, implicit TSC, and implicit RT) 
we then fitted exploratory models including main effects of age, temporal direction, and 
temporal distance, as well as all higher order interactions. The final models retained the main 
effects and all significant interactions. Supplemental analyses examined the role of covariates. 
Any covariates showing significant associations with age (see Table 1) were added to the models 
to examine whether age effects remained significant. Because of concerns about collinearity, 
covariates were added one at a time.  
 
Results 
Explicit Temporal Self-continuity 
 The first set of analyses focused on explicit TSC ratings based on self-reported overlap 
between the present self and past or future selves. A 3-level model estimated effects of age and 
temporal direction (past vs. future), as a function of temporal distance (1 month to 120 months), 
on explicit TSC (Table 2). The effect for temporal direction failed to reach significance, 
indicating that participants’ perceived similarity to their past selves did not differ substantially 
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from perceived similarity to their future selves. There were significant main effects of age 
(indicating higher explicit TSC with advanced age) and temporal distance (indicating 
progressively lower explicit TSC with increasing distance from the present). This effect was 
qualified by a significant interaction between age and temporal distance indicating that the 
decrease in explicit TSC with distance was less steep in older as compared to younger adults. 
This pattern is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Supplemental simple slope analyses (Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006) were conducted 
to examine the effects of age on TSC, averaged across future and past, for each temporal 
distance. All age effects reached significance (ps < .04), but the coefficient for the simple slope 
increased with growing distance (1 month = .012, 3 months = .016, 6 months = .019, 1 year  = 
.022, 5 years = .028, 10 years = .031). 
Implicit Temporal Self-continuity: Percent Agreement with the Present 
The next set of analyses focused on implicit TSC as captured by the agreement between 
present, past and future trait ratings. A 3-level model estimated effects of age and temporal 
direction (past vs. future), as a function of temporal distance (1 month to 120 months), on 
percent agreement with present trait ratings on the me/not me task (Table 3). As for explicit 
ratings, the main effect of temporal direction was not significant. Main effects were significant 
for both age (indicating that implicit TSC increased with age) and temporal distance (indicating 
that implicit TSC decreased with increasing distance from the present). These main effects were 
qualified by a significant interaction between temporal direction and temporal distance indicating 
that the drop in implicit TSC with increasing distance was less pronounced for the future than for 
the past. As for explicit TSC, there was an age by temporal distance interaction: Compared to 
younger adults, older adults’ implicit TSC decreased less steeply as a function of increasing 
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temporal distance (see Figure 2). 
Again, we conducted supplemental simple slope analyses to examine the effects of age on 
TSC, averaged across future and past, for each temporal distance. All age effects reached 
significance (ps < .05), but the coefficient for the simple slope increased with growing distance 
(1 month = .113, 3 months = .152, 6 months = .177, 1 year  = .201, 5 years = .259, 10 years = 
.284). 
Implicit Temporal Self-continuity: Reaction Time 
 Next, we turned to reaction times in the implicit TSC task and examined variations in the 
time it took to make a given trait rating. We fit a three-level model including word and subject as 
random effects and age, temporal direction (past vs. future), and temporal distance (1 month to 
120 months) as fixed effects. Main effects were significant for temporal distance, temporal 
direction, and age, all with positive coefficients indicating that RTs were higher for longer 
temporal distances, for the past (relative to the future), and for older as compared to younger 
adults. These main effects were qualified by a significant age by temporal distance by temporal 
direction interaction (see Table 4). To examine the interaction, we fit separate 3-level models for 
the future and past conditions including word and subject as random effects (see Table 5). For 
the past condition, main effects were significant for temporal distance (b = 1.843, SE = .174, p < 
.001) and age (b = .544, SE = .188, p < .01). However, the age by temporal distance interaction 
was not significant (b = -.013, SE = .009, p = .15). For the future condition, there was a 
significant main effect of age as well as a significant interaction between age and temporal 
distance (b = .021, SE = .008, p < .014; see Table 4) indicating that the effect of temporal 
distance on RT varied by age. As seen in Figure 3, RTs for older adults were similar across 
temporal distances. RTs for younger adults, in contrast, became faster with greater distance into 
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the future.  
Covariate Analyses for Explicit Temporal Self-continuity 
In a final step we examined whether the main effect of age and the interactions between 
age and temporal distance remained significant after controlling for each of the covariates that 
showed significant associations with age (i.e., race, mental health, physical health, FTP, 
neuroticism, vocabulary, working memory, and processing speed; see Table 1). In addition to the 
main effects and interactions shown in Tables 2-4, each model included the main effect of the 
covariate and the interaction between the covariate and temporal distance. We fit separate 
models for each of the covariates and for each of the three TSC variables (i.e., explicit TSC, 
implicit trait agreements, and implicit RTs). For analyses examining implicit RTs, we selectively 
focused on the future condition which had shown a significant age by temporal distance 
interaction.  
After including the covariates, the main effects of age and the age by temporal distance 
interactions remained statistically significant (ps < .05) for all models with one exception: For 
RTs in the future condition of the implicit task, including FTP as a covariate reduced the age by 
temporal distance interaction to a trend (p = .07). 
 
Discussion 
To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine age differences in TSC measured 
both explicitly and implicitly and across multiple temporal distances into the past and future. As 
predicted, advancing age was consistently associated with greater explicit and implicit TSC, 
especially for larger temporal distances.  
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In general, these findings are consistent with life-span developmental expectations of 
age-related goal changes away from growth and toward maintenance (Ebner et al., 2006) as well 
as the possibility (raised by SST, Carstensen, 2006) that older adults may be living in an 
“extended present” and thus perceive little if any difference between their present, past, and 
future selves. However, results were not consistent with the proportional argument raised by 
Janet (1877) in that age effects were not inversely proportional to ratios in chronological age 
(they were smaller) and their relative size was not consistent across time intervals (e.g., the effect 
size at 10 years was not twice as large as the effect size at 5 years; see Wittmann & Lehnhoff, 
2005 and Friedman & Janssen, 2010 who also failed to support the proportional argument).  
Analyses of RT data point towards potential age differences in the underlying 
mechanisms of TSC: When rating their future traits, younger adults responded more quickly to 
increasingly distant future time intervals whereas older adults’ response times did not vary by 
distance. One way to interpret these findings is that older adults use the same episodic simulation 
processes to estimate trait ratings for their present and future selves because their future is 
merely seen an extension of the present whereas younger adults may shift to a different, less 
resource intensive mechanism once their future selves become so dissimilar from their present 
selves that episodic simulation is no longer possible. Further research is needed to tease apart 
these possibilities. 
We also considered a range of covariates that might account for age differences in TSC, 
but found that none of the variables under consideration could account for the observed age 
effects. Thus, further research on potential mechanisms behind age differences is needed. As 
noted, this could involve a more in-depth exploration of the role of growth versus maintenance 
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goals or neuroimaging work assessing potential age differences in the brain regions recruited 
during TSC ratings. 
Beyond a better understanding of age effects, our findings contribute to the broader 
literature on TSC. Rather than showing stepwise transitions between past, present, and future, 
people’s present selves appear to gradually emerge from the past and slip into the future. Further, 
whereas explicit TSC shows similar decrements with increasing temporal distance for the past 
and for the future, implicit TSC shows an asymmetrical pattern with a steeper decrease from 
present to past than from present to future. Thus, only the pattern of implicit TSC is consistent 
with the aforementioned “end of history effect” (Quoidbach et al., 2013), whereas the explicit 
TSC measure shows a more balanced perception of past and future change. This implies that the 
two aspects of TSC are not interchangeable and may be driven by different underlying 
mechanisms.   
Our study has a number of important limitations that should be addressed in future 
research. First, we only included a single measure for each type of TSC. A wide range of 
operational definitions and measures of TSC have been used in prior work, and they appear to 
differ considerably and may be assessing different constructs. It would be valuable to investigate 
the extent to which different TSC measures are associated with each other. Factor analyses could 
help to determine the underling dimensions, which could then guide future research regarding the 
specific role that each component may play in health and well-being across the life span.  
Another concern with our assessment approach is the inclusion of multiple temporal 
distances which could be considered as both a strength and a weakness. On the one hand, it 
allowed us to examine age differences in the specific slope of self-continuity with increasing 
temporal distance. On the other hand, repeated assessments may have skewed results by 
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introducing contrast or anchoring effects. To address this concern, future studies could assess 
temporal distance as a between-subjects variable or include fewer time intervals. 
It is also possible that the very nature of self-continuity differs by age. Self-continuity for 
the past may be qualitatively different for young adults because the most distant time intervals 
reach back into childhood and adolescence, whereas self-continuity for the future may be 
hypothetical for old-old adults because the most distant time intervals extend beyond their 
remaining life expectancy. To examine if our results were disproportionately influenced by 
extreme age groups, we repeated our analyses for implicit and explicit TSC with a restricted age 
range of 30 to 80 years and found that the pattern of age effects remained the same. Future 
studies should further explore potential variations in the meaning of self-continuity across the 
life span and control for significant life events, such as those that may be associated with 
younger adulthood and identity formation (e.g., starting a career).  
A related concern is that, the present study’s design was cross-sectional and thus cannot 
control for potential cohort effects in conceptualizations of the self over time. Conceivably, 
generation-specific societal events may have occurred to certain cohorts but not others, and these 
events may have constituted significant life experiences affecting identity formation. An 
excellent target for further investigation would be to study longitudinal changes in TSC using the 
measures from the present study in a life span sample. This would also make it possible to assess 
age differences in the accuracy of anticipated future similarity, in the same ways that prior 
studies have examined age differences in accuracy of anticipated future life satisfaction (e.g., 
Lachman, Röcke, Rosnick, & Ryff, 2008; Lang, Weiss, Gerstorf, & Wagner, 2013; Ryff, 1991). 
If the observed age differences in self-continuity are corroborated by future studies, it 
would be important to examine their practical implications. With a growing population of older 
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adults and scarcity in access to health care and financial resources, it will be critical to 
understand how future self-construal influences health and financial decisions – especially those 
involving trade-offs between proximal and distal outcomes. Moreover, recent studies have linked 
higher self-continuity to more ethical behavior among younger adults (Hershfield, Cohen, & 
Thompson, 2012) and it would be interesting to explore the extent to which variations in TSC 
can account for age differences in altruism and other forms of ethical behavior (e.g., Freund & 
Blanchard-Fields, 2013).   
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Table 1 
Descriptive Information for Demographics and  
Covariates and their Correlations with Age 
 M(SD) rAge 
Demographics   
    Age 50.15 (19.20) -- 
    Sex (% female) 56% -.03 
    Race (% White) 84%    .31** 
    Education level 5.51 (1.73) .20 
    Income level 2.40 (1.12) .20 
Background   
    Mental health 45.57 (11.68)    .34** 
    Physical health 50.38 (9.97)   -.35** 
    Future time perspective 44.55 (14.74)   -.51** 
Personality   
    Neuroticism 5.68 (2.09)   -.34** 
    Extraversion 6.62 (2.30)  .03 
    Openness 7.67 (1.87)  .04 
    Agreeableness 7.51 (1.84)  .09 
    Conscientiousness 8.03 (1.67) -.10 
Cognition   
    Vocabulary 18.49  (4.15)    .49** 
    Working Memory .86 (.13)   -.31** 
    Processing Speed 57.74 (14.44)   -.71** 
Notes. Correlations for sex and race are point-biserial,  
all others are Pearson correlations.  
**p < .01, *p < .05. 
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Table 2 
Estimates for Explicit Temporal Self-Continuity: Self-reported 
Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale 
      Estimate           SE             p  
Fixed effects    
   Intercept* 5.857 .106 .001 
   Temporal distance -.310 .012 .001 
   Temporal direction -.090 .054 .097 
   Age .012 .006 .039 
   Temporal distance x Age .004 .001 .001 
Random effects    
   Variance Intercept .887 .151 .001 
   Residual Variance 1.670 .069 .001 
Note. The temporal distance variable was natural log-transformed to  
ensure that residuals fit criteria for normality.  
*The intercept is centered at 1 month.  
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Table 3 
Estimates for Implicit Temporal Self-Continuity: Percent Agreement 
with Present Trait Ratings in the Me/Not Me Task 
      Estimate           SE             p  
Fixed effects    
   Intercept 91.558 .840 .001 
   Temporal distance -1.971 .101 .001 
   Temporal direction -.396 .322 .218 
   Age .113 .044 .012 
   Temporal direction x Temporal   
   distance 
-.206 .101 .041 
   Temporal distance x Age .036 .005 .001 
Random effects    
   Variance Intercept 54.774 9.365 .001 
   Residual Variance 107.274 4.418 .001 
Note. The dependent variable is scaled in numerical percent (i.e., each 
unit is a percentage point). 
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Table 4 
Estimates for Implicit Temporal Self-Continuity: Reaction Time in the Me/Not Me 
Task 
      Estimate           SE             p  
Fixed effects    
   Intercept 719.486 3.921 .001 
   Temporal distance .903 .125 .001 
   Temporal direction 5.703 .340 .001 
   Age .557 .165 .001 
   Temporal direction x Temporal distance .940 .125 .001 
   Temporal distance x Age .004 .007 .567 
   Temporal direction x Age -.013 .021 .525 
   Temporal distance x Temporal direction x Age -.017 .007 .01 
Random effects    
   Variance Intercept 870.465 135.003 .001 
   Word Intercept 65.397 29.577 .027 
   Covariance Intercept, Word 218.922 16.306 .001 
   Residual Variance 1987.005 23.590 .001 
Note. Estimates are for effects on raw reaction time (in milliseconds). 
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Table 5 
Separate Past and Future Estimates for Implicit Temporal Self-Continuity: 
Reaction Time in the Me/Not Me Task 
           Estimate          SE                 p  
Future    
Fixed effects    
   Intercept (future) 713.783 3.896 .001 
   Temporal distance (future) -.038 .161 .815 
   Age (future) .571 .170 .001 
   Temporal distance x Age (future) .021 .008 .014 
Random effects    
   Variance Intercept (future) 911.287 142.922 .001 
   Word Intercept (future) 55.877 26.191 .033 
   Covariance Intercept, Word (future) 268.699 23.047 .001 
   Residual Variance (future) 165.636 28.843 .001 
Past    
Fixed effects    
   Intercept (past) 725.188 4.379 .001 
   Temporal distance (past) 1.843 .174 .001 
   Age (past) .544 .188 .010 
   Temporal distance x Age (past) -.013 .009 .148 
Random effects    
   Variance Intercept (past) 1123.224 175.292 .001 
   Word Intercept (past) 75.252 34.677 .030 
   Covariance Intercept, Word (past) 277.058 25.295 .001 
   Residual Variance (past) 1928.016 33.690 .001 
Note. Estimates are for effects on raw reaction time (in milliseconds). 
Separate models are reported here for the future and past conditions, thus 
the temporal direction variable is not included. 
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Figure 1. Explicit temporal self-continuity as a function of age and temporal distance (in 
months).  
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Figure 2. Percent agreement, in me/not me trait ratings, as a function of age and temporal 
distance (in months).  
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Figure 3. Reaction time in me/not me trait rating task, as a function of age and temporal distance 
(in months).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
